Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) is an upcoming methodology that is considered to have several advantages over game theory. ARA solutions for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions have been found but only under strong assumptions which make the model somewhat unrealistic. In this paper, we use ARA methodology to model FPSB auctions using more realistic assumptions. We define a new utility function that considers bidders' wealth, we assume a reserve price and find solutions not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse as well as risk-seeking bidders. We model the problem using ARA for the non-strategic play and the Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) solution concepts.
Introduction

Decision vs Game Theoretic Approach
The use of auctions is from time immemorial. The first modern academic paper using decision theoretic model for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions 1 was presented by Friedman (1956) . Capen et al. (1971) and Keefer et al. (1991) reported that in practice, bidders do indeed use decision theory.
1 Bidders place their bids in sealed envelopes and simultaneously hand over them to the auctioneer. Those envelopes are then opened and the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the amount equal to the bid.
On the other hand, Bayesian game theoretic approaches were proposed as well for these auctions. Vickrey (1961) analysed n bidders in FPSB auctions with the values drawn from a uniform distribution with common support. Criesmer et al. (1967) analysed the equilibrium of FPSB auctions in which bidders' valuations were drawn from uniform distributions with different supports, while Wilson (1969) developed the first closed form equilibrium analysis with the common value model (value of the auctioned item is same for all bidders). Riley and Samuelson (1981) extended Vickrey's analysis to n bidders whose values were drawn independently and identically from a general commonly known distribution that was strictly increasing and differentiable. Then, Myerson (1981) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) , among others, also used Bayesian game theoretic model for auctions. Cox et al. (1982a) and Cox et al. (1982b) generalised the Vickrey's model in Bayesian game theoretic perspective to the case of risk-averse bidders who have CRRA utility functions. The CRRA utility function is defined later in Subsection 1.3. Maskin and Riley (2000) analysed FPSB auctions assuming the valuations of each bidder is drawn from commonly known different distributions. Goeree et al. (2002) ; Bajari and Hortacsu (2005) ; Campo et al. (2011) ; Gentry et al. (2015) ; Li and Tan (2017) among others also used Bayesian game theoretic models for auctions.
Using a Bayesian game theoretic model requires a strong common knowledge assumption that all bidders who are considered to be strategic, draw their valuation for the auctioned item from a commonly known distribution. The common knowledge assumption can be unrealistic because the bidders may draw their valuation from different distribution(s) and the distribution used by one bidder is usually not commonly known to others. In fact, often the bidders will try and keep their information secret so as to gain competitive advantage. On the other hand, while a decision theoretic approach does not require the common knowledge assumption, it does assume that the other bidders are non-strategic. Assuming non-strategic bidders may also be unrealistic because the other bidders may often be strategic.
Adversarial Risk Analysis
In order to overcome the shortcomings of both the decision theoretic as well as the Bayesian game theoretic approaches, Ríos Insua et al. (2009) introduced an approach called adversarial risk analysis (ARA) to deal with the decision making problems in the presence of an intelligent adversary such as in counter-terrorism, war, politics, auctions, etc. ARA solves the decision making problem from just one of the agent's perspective and treats the intelligent adversaries' decisions as uncertainties. ARA is a Bayesian approach because subjective distributions are used to model the uncertainties about the outcomes and about the unknown preferences, beliefs and capabilities of intelligent adversaries. However, unlike the Bayesian game theory, ARA does not require that these subjective distributions be the same for all the players and that they be commonly known.
In order to give a general insight into ARA framework, we consider a two player simultaneous game in which one player, Brenda (B), has the set of actions B while her opponent, Charles (C), has the set of actions C. There is a chance variable S which determines the utility u B (b, c, s) that Brenda receives and the utility u C (b, c, s) that Charles receives from each pair of actions (b, c). Figure 1 represents this game in the form of a multi-agent influence diagram (MAID) where rectangles, circles and hexagons represent decision, chance and utility nodes respectively. Figure 1a represents this game from both Brenda and Charles's point of view while Figure 1b represents this game from Brenda's point of view only where Charles's decision node is now a chance node for Brenda because she is uncertain about his actions. Figure 1 : (a) The MAID for the two player simultaneous game (b) The MAID for the two players from Brenda's perspective ARA is typically solved using backward induction, where, one first considers the very last node and then solves for each node in the reverse order until one reaches the starting node. To solve Brenda's game, we start with the utility node u B , then solve for the random outcome node S and finally, the starting node of her own bid, B. The typical objective (although, other objectives are possible too) is to maximize the expected utility. Being a Bayesian approach, one integrates out the uncertainty at the random nodes and maximizes the expected utility at the decision nodes.
To solve Brenda's game, she will start at node u B by finding the expected utility by taking into account her uncertainty about the outcomes S
where p B (s|b, c) denotes Brenda's uncertainty in S. Next, she will find her expected utility by taking into account her uncertainty about Charles's actions as
where p B (c) is Brenda's distribution over Charles's actions. Finally, Brenda would be seeking to find the action b * that maximizes her expected utility as
The main challenge in the above modelling is to determine p B (c). Brenda may elicit p B (c) either by using her subjective beliefs or by using data on the past auction bids by Charles on similar items or by using an expert opinion. But, she could also choose to elicit p B (c) by modelling Charles's strategic thinking process. For example, she may believe that Charles is an expected utility maximizer, just like her, and would choose the action c * that maximizes his expected utility. She can aim to find c * , the action that will maximize the expected utility for Charles, if she knows about Charles's utility function u C (b, c, s) and his probabilities p C (b) and p C (s|b, c). However, u C (b, c, s), p C (b) and p C (s|b, c) are typically unknown to her. She can cope her uncertainty about Charles's utility and his probabilities through eliciting random utility U C (b, c, s) and random probabilities P C (b) and P C (s|b, c). Then, following a backward induction approach similar to her own, she can find Charles's random expected utility as
Then, she could find his random optimal action C * as
Finally, she could find her required predictive distribution p B (c) about Charles's action c as
Now, she is able to solve her decision making problem. This is how Brenda can optimise her action using ARA framework. However, ARA solutions in the context of commonly used models such as non-strategic play, levelk thinking, mirror equilibrium or Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE) for an adversary's reasoning have their own modelling and computational challenges and that also depend upon the decision making problem in hand.
In addition to the applications of ARA in a variety of real life situations, Banks et al. (2015) considered FPSB auctions assuming that each bidder is risk-neutral. They performed ARA from one of the bidder's perspective using different solution concepts such as non-strategic play, minimax perspective, level-k thinking, mirror equilibrium and BNE. However, they did not consider a bidder's wealth while defining her/his utility function. Also, they did not model risk-averse or risk-seeking behaviour of the bidders. They also did not consider reserve price for the auctioned item which is a common practice in FPSB auctions.
Utility Function
Previous literature reveals that risk aversion is an important determinant of bidders' bidding behaviour in auctions (see e.g. Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Maskin and Riley, 1984; Gentry et al., 2015, among others) . Risk-averse bidders are the bidders who do not want to lose the item. Thus, they bid more aggressively than the risk-neutral bidders. On the other hand, risk-seeking bidders are the bidders who are keen to get the item at a low price. Thus, they bid less aggressively than the risk-neutral bidders. In FPSB auctions, a bidder does not really know about other bidders' behaviours. For this reason, risk aversion is more significant to be taken into account for these auctions (see e.g. Cox et al., 1988; Kagel, 1995; Dorsey and Razzolini, 2003) . Holt and Laury (2002) stated that the most commonly used utility function in the literature of auctions for risk-averse bidders is constant relative riskaversion (CRRA) for its computational ease. The CRRA utility function for a bidder having wealth w is defined as
where, (1 − r) = −wu ′′ (w)/u ′ (w) is the coefficient of CRRA or Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-aversion (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965) . The coefficient of CRRA measures the proportion of wealth an individual will choose to hold on a risky asset, for a given level of wealth w. The utility function (2) is strictly convex for 1 < r ≤ 2 which represents the risk-seeking behaviour, it is linear for r = 1 which represents the risk-neutral behaviour and it is strictly concave for 0 < r < 1 which represents the risk-averse behaviour (see e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002 , for more details). Cox et al. (1982a Cox et al. ( , 1985 ; Maréchal and Morand (2011) , among others, used (2) without considering bidders' wealth and defined their utility function as
where, v is a bidder's true value and b is the successful bid. On the other hand, for example, Lu and Perrigne (2008) ; Li and Tan (2017) , among others, used (2) while also considering bidders' wealth and defined their utility function in case of their successful bid as
where, they assumed that all bidders have the same wealth w ≥ 0.
Contributions in this Paper
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We extend Banks et al. (2015) by developing ARA solutions for nonstrategic play and BNE for FPSB auctions for a realistic case, where in,
• we consider a reserve price for the auctioned item (typically, known to each bidder in advance).
• we take into account bidders' wealth.
• we find solutions not only for risk-neutral bidders but also for risk-averse or risk-seeking bidders.
• we assume that the auctioned item is normal 2 and define a realistic bidder's CRRA utility function.
• unlike the utility function (3), where it is assumed that all bidders have same wealth, we assume that the bidders may have different wealths.
• we use the CRRA parameter r and also define a new CRRA parameter a to incorporate the effect of increase in wealth on bidder's risk behaviour.
Structure of the Paper
In this paper, we assume that we are finding ARA solutions for Brenda (B) against her opponent Charles (C) in the non-strategic play and BNE asymmetric case while we assume n bidders in the BNE symmetric case. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present our new utility function and new CRRA parameters. In Section 3, we present ARA for the non-strategic play solution concept where Brenda assumes Charles is non-strategic. In Section 4, we present ARA for the BNE solution concept assuming n bidders for symmetric case while assuming two bidders for asymmetric case. In Section 5, we discuss the results we obtained in this paper.
2 New Utility Function and New CRRA Parameters
New Utility Function
For the utility function (3), the wealth w has been defined in many ways in the auction literature. For example, w ≥ 0 (Lu and Perrigne, 2008; Li and Tan, 2017) , 0 ≤ w ≤w, wherew is the upper support of wealth among n bidders (Gentry et al., 2015) and w > ̺, where ̺ is the entry cost of auction . However, not all these values of w are possible in practice because the bidder can pay the amount of her successful bid b only when her wealth is greater than or equal to her bid i.e. w ≥ b. However, the utility function (3) allows b > w which is not realistic. Using (3), Brenda's expected utility would be of the form
where F (b) is Brenda's probability of winning the auctioned item. The expected utility function (4) has been used by for example, Gentry et al. (2015) and Li and Tan (2017) in game theoretic perspective among others. In (4), w r has been taken as Brenda's utility in case of not winning the auctioned item with probability
We assume that the auction has no entry cost. Assuming this, the function (4) is realistic only when Brenda is assumed to be a risk-neutral (r = 1) bidder because if she loses the item, her wealth would remain same i.e. w, however, it is unrealistic when she is assumed to be a risk-averse or risk-seeking bidder. When Brenda is assumed to be a risk-averse bidder (0 < r < 1), this function shows that she would experience an increase in her wealth to w r > w if 0 < w < 1 and a decrease in her wealth to w r < w if w > 1 in case of not winning the auctioned item. Whereas, Brenda would experience a decrease in her wealth to w r < w if 0 < w < 1 and an increase in her wealth to w r > w if w > 1 in case of not winning the auctioned item when she is assumed to be a risk-seeking bidder (1 < r ≤ 2). This is unrealistic since bidder's wealth remains unchanged in auctions in case of not winning the auctioned item irrespective of whether she is a risk-averse or risk-seeking bidder.
As an example, suppose that Brenda has true value v = $150 for the auctioned item which has no reserve price. From her subjective belief about Charles, lets assume that she elicits the distribution F (c) = 9c 8×200 − c 9 8×200 9 on Charles's bid c (Banks et al., 2015) . To find her optimal bid, she can replace c by b and could have F (b) as her probability of winning the item. Using the expected utility function (4), Brenda can find her optimal bid by solving the following equation
(5) Table 1 shows that Brenda's optimal bid b * increases with increase in her risk-aversion, which is realistic, because bidders bid more aggressively with increase in their risk-aversion. It also shows that Brenda's optimal bid b * decreases with her wealth w, which is unrealistic when the item is normal, because the demand of the normal item increases with wealth (Baisa, 2017) . Further, it shows that Brenda's optimal bid b * can be much higher than her wealth w i.e. b * > w especially for higher risk-aversion levels (r = 0.10 or 0.05). This is unrealistic, because if she wins, how will she pay the amount of her successful bid that exceeds her wealth? Now, if we assume that w = 0, then the expected utility function (4) would be of the form
The first row of Table 1 shows Brenda's optimal bids for this special case where w = 0. This function has been used by Cox et al. (1982a) and Cox et al. (1985) among others for risk-averse bidders. Banks et al. (2015) also used this function but assuming risk-neutral bidders. Finding the optimal bid using (6) is also unrealistic because if she places one of the bids as shown in first row of the Table 1 and wins the auctioned item, how will she pay the amount of her successful bid when her wealth is zero?
We propose to modify the utility function so that w ≥ b i.e. a person is only allowed to bid a value that is not greater than her wealth. Additionally, since in equilibrium, bidders never bid above their true values (Gentry et al., 2015) , we bound the bidders' bid above by their true value i.e. b ≤ v. Also, we assume that w ≥ v because she can bid and pay an amount b ≤ v only if her wealth is at least equal to her true value. Thus, we have b ≤ v ≤ w. Further, we assume that a person's wealth remains unchanged if she loses her bid and that this also holds when she is risk-averse or risk-seeking. Thus, we propose to use the following utility function for Brenda
where a is a modified CRRA parameter defined later in Subsection 2.2. Thus, for our proposed utility function (7), Brenda's expected utility would be of the form
The above equation simplifies to
Thus, using (9), Brenda can find her optimal bid by solving the following equation
The utility function (7) is more realistic in the sense that it allows Brenda to add up her profit to her wealth after the successful bid. It also allows Brenda to bid strictly less than or equal to her true value v and consequently to bid less than or equal to her wealth at any assumed level of her risk-aversion. Lets assume that Brenda has wealth w = $150, true value v = $150 and F (b) as considered earlier in this Section. Then, using Equation (10), she could get her optimal bids as shown in first row of Table 1 for different assumed risk-aversion levels. Note that she will get these values since her optimal bid is not affected by her wealth in Equation (10). Thus, this function gives the leverage to assume any wealth w ≥ v for Brenda and also her optimal bid to be bounded above by her wealth for any assumed risk-aversion level i.e. b * ≤ v ≤ w.
We define (7) as Brenda's wealth plus her profit where she could be riskneutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking in her profit. Thus, by letting her profit v − b = x, we can show that (7) is a CRRA utility function since
where (1−a) is the coefficient of CRRA that incorporates the effect of increase in wealth on bidder's risk behaviour and is defined in the next Subsection 2.2.
New CRRA Parameters
Our assumption that the auctioned item is normal implies that a bidder could be more risk-averse (or less risk-seeking) with increase in her/his wealth. We modify the risk behaviour parameter of that bidder who has more wealth than the other bidder while the risk behaviour parameter for the bidder having less wealth is assumed to be equal to her/his baseline risk behaviour parameter which is defined below. Similarly, we compare the risk behaviour of a bidder at her/his higher level to lower level of wealth. Thus, we modify the risk behaviour parameter of a bidder for her/his higher level of wealth while assume that she/he would have baseline risk behaviour parameter at her/his lower level of wealth. Firstly, to model Brenda's risk behaviour at an increase level of her wealth compared with her own lower level of wealth, we modify the CRRA parameter as follows:
We define r B to be Brenda's baseline risk behaviour parameter which represents her natural risk appetite at her wealth, say w 1 . Note that r B is the same as the r we defined earlier in Subsection 1.3. She is assumed to be a risk-neutral bidder for r B = 1, a risk-averse bidder for 0 < r B < 1 and a riskseeking bidder for 1 < r B ≤ 2. Lets assume that her circumstances change (e.g. she gains an inheritance) and her wealth is increased to w 2 (w 2 > w 1 ). At this increased wealth level, we expect her to be more risk-averse (or less risk-seeking) for the same auctioned item. So, we modify her risk behaviour parameter having wealth w 2 relative to wealth w 1 as
where, we define 0 < h = w 1 /w 2 < 1, is the fraction of lower and higher wealths. Note that here, for 0 < r B ≤ 2 (r B = 1), a B < r B i.e. if Brenda was risk-averse (risk-seeking) at wealth level w 1 , then she is even more riskaverse (less risk-seeking) at wealth level w 2 . Also, a B = r B i.e. if Brenda was risk-neutral at wealth level w 1 , she is also risk-neutral at wealth level w 2 .
Secondly, when Brenda is bidding against Charles who has wealth w C , we modify their CRRA parameters as follows:
If Brenda believes that Charles has wealth w C , we define R C as Charles's natural risk appetite for the auctioned item that Brenda believes. In this case, Brenda could draw R C from a uniform distribution U with support (0, 1) if she believes that Charles is a risk-averse bidder. She could draw R C from a uniform distribution U with support (1, 2] if she believes that Charles is a risk-seeking bidder. In this case, we assume that Brenda has wealth w B where w B > w C i.e. Brenda has more wealth than Charles. Thus, Brenda's risk behaviour parameter in this case would be same as defined in (11) with 0 < h = w C /w B < 1. However, if Brenda believes that Charles has more wealth than her i.e. w C > w B , she can modify Charles's risk-behaviour parameter as
where 0 < h = w B /w C < 1 and A C < R C if Brenda believes that Charles is risk-averse (risk-seeking) bidder in this case. Thus, A C may take values in the interval (0, 1) if she believes that he is a risk-averse bidder. On the other hand if she believes that he is a risk-seeking bidder, A C may take values in the interval (1, 2 h ] and A C = 1, if she believes that he is a risk-neutral bidder. In this case, Brenda's risk behaviour parameter would remain unchanged i.e. it is a B = r B for 0 < r B ≤ 2.
Non-Strategic Play
In this section, we show how an ARA solution for Brenda's optimal bid can be found when she assumes that Charles is a non-strategic opponent. In this case, Charles will bid an amount that is independent of Brenda's bid. We assume that Brenda bids an amount b, having wealth w B and true value v B for the auctioned item. We assume that the auctioned item is normal and it has a reserve price τ such that τ < b ≤ v B ≤ w B . We assume that τ is known in advance to each bidder. We define Brenda's wealth w B , as the money she has at her disposal. She does not know about Charles's wealth W C and places a distribution H BC on his wealth. She also does not know about Charles's true value V C and his bid C for the auctioned item. So, she places a distribution G BC on his true value according to her belief and then finds the distribution of his bid C as defined in Equation (14) below. For Charles, she also believes that τ < c ≤ v C ≤ w C holds, where v C and w C are chosen by Brenda from the distributions G BC and H BC respectively.
Brenda's probability of winning from a bid of amount b is given by
where, F BC is the distribution over Charles's bid with support (γ, κ] ⊆ IR + with γ ≥ τ that Brenda believes and C is the random variable of Charles's bid that she believes. To obtain F BC , Brenda divides her introspection into two parts as G BC , the CDF of Charles's true value with support (γ, κ] that she believes and T BC , the CDF for fraction of Charles's true value p = c/v C that he bids with support (γ/v C , 1] that she believes. Then, she finds her subjective distribution function over C = P V C , the amount of Charles's bid as
As 1 γ/v C t BC (p)dp = 1, the above equation simplifies to
where, g BC (v C ) is the probability density function for the Charles's true value what Brenda believes and t BC (p) is the probability density function for fraction of Charles's true value that he bids what Brenda believes. Equation (13) assumes that Charles's true value V C and fraction of his true value P are independent. In Equation (13), the whole region of integration has been divided into two regions for the random variables V C and P in order to find the distribution of C. Figure 2 shows the division of the integration region into these two regions. Area between the two curves shows the integration region between γ and κ. The area A corresponds to first integral part whereas area B corresponds to second integral part of Equation (13). Thus, using (7) but with change of notation, we rewrite Brenda's expected utility function (8) as This Equation simplifies to
where F BC (b) is her probability of winning from a successful bid b. Finally, Brenda's optimal bid b * may be found by solving the following equation
Numerical methods may often be needed to solve (16) for b * .
Example 1 Suppose Brenda's true value for the item is v B = $150, she has her wealth w B = $150 and the auctioned item has reserve price τ . She could assume Charles's true value for the auctioned item as a uniform distribution
with support (γ, κ]. As she believes that Charles is a non-strategic player such that his bid is proportional to his true value, she could assume the distribution for the proportion of his value that he bids as
Using Equation (14) where c is replaced by b, we get 4
Suppose τ = $30 and Brenda believes that G BC has support (30, 200] . Then substituting τ = $30, γ = $30 and κ = $200 in (17), she can get F BC (b) which leads her to find her optimal bid by solving Equation (16) for her risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking behaviour. Now, assuming Brenda is a risk-neutral bidder i.e. a B = 1, her optimal bid by solving Equation (16) for w B = v B = $150 turns out to be $88.04 with probability of winning of 0.415 and with the expected utility of 175.71. Now, we assume that Brenda and Charles are risk-averse bidders. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that Brenda chooses Charles's wealth to be w C = $150 from the distribution H BC . We assume that Brenda's baseline risk behaviour parameter is r B when she has w B = $150. She believes that Charles's baseline risk behaviour parameter is R C at his chosen wealth w C = $150. We assume another level of Brenda's wealth i.e. w B = $200. Thus, with the wealth w B = $200, we expect her to be more risk-averse than Charles who has w C = $150 or even herself when she has wealth w B = $150. By using (11) his true value that he bids as assumed by Banks et al. (2015) but with reserve price τ and additionally take into account the effect of wealth by placing a distribution on Charles's wealth.
4 The computations in this paper have been performed by using Maple TM
In Table 2 , we show how Brenda's optimal bids, her probabilities of winning and her expected utilities change with change in her wealth and also how they change with change in r B . It shows that with increase in her wealth i.e. w B = $200, she is more risk-averse and consequently she bids higher than when she has w B = $150. Similarly, having wealth w B = $200, she is also more risk-averse than Charles who has w C = $150. Moreover, it shows that her probability of winning increases with increase in her wealth, with increase in her risk-aversion and with increase in her optimal bid. However, it shows that Brenda's expected utility increases with increase in her wealth, with decrease in her risk-aversion and with decrease in her optimal bid. We also plot Brenda's optimal bids in Figure 3a , her probabilities of winning in Figure 3b and her expected utilities in Figure 3c . Now, we find Brenda's optimal bids when she and Charles are assumed to be risk-seeking bidders. Having w B = $200, we expect her to be less riskseeking than her baseline risk seeking level r B . Again by using (11) In Table 3 , we show how Brenda's optimal bids, her probabilities of winning, her expected utilities change with change in her wealth and also how they change with change in r B when she is assumed to be a risk-seeking and risk-neutral bidder. It shows that with increase in her wealth i.e. w B = $200, she is less risk-seeking and consequently she bids higher than when she has w B = $150. On the other hand having wealth w B = $200, she is also less risk-seeking than Charles who has w C = $150. Similarly, it shows that her probability of winning increases with increase in her wealth, with increase in her optimal bids and decrease in her risk-seeking level. Also, her expected utility increases with increase in her risk-seeking level and with decrease in her optimal bid. We also plot Brenda's optimal bids in Figure 4a , her probabilities of winning in Figure 4b and her expected utilities in Figure 4c . 4 Bayes Nash Equilibrium
In this Section, we show how ARA solutions for Brenda's optimal bid can be found when she assumes that Charles is a strategic opponent and he will find his optimal bid through BNE solution concept. We assume both the symmetric and asymmetric cases of BNE.
Symmetric Case
We consider n bidders for this case. In Bayesian game theoretic perspective, symmetric case assumes that each bidder randomly draws the value of the item from the same commonly known distribution to all bidders. This case assumes that out of n bidders, the ith bidder has value V i for the auctioned item, where V 1 , . . . , V n are independently drawn from a commonly known distribution G to all the bidders who know that each bidder knows G. This is the strong common knowledge assumption. In ARA perspective, a quite natural justification is to assume that Brenda believes that all of other n − 1 bidders will draw their true value from the distribution G instead of assuming that all know the common distribution G. In this perspective, we also assume that the ith bidder has wealth W i ≥ V i for i = 1, . . . , n. Each bidder knows her/his own wealth and has a distribution H to know about other bidders' wealths. We assume that Brenda is the first bidder among n bidders who has true value v 1 and wealth w 1 for the item and consequently bids b(v 1 ). For simplicity, we relabel w 1 to w and v 1 to v.
Thus, using (7), Brenda's expected utility having bid function
The bidding function, b(v) would be winning bid if and only if all other bidders bid b(v i ) for i = 2, . . . , n are less than b(v). Now, as each bidder independently draws her/his value, it would happen with probability G(v) n−1 for the remaining n−1 bidders. So, her expected utility by bidding b(v) would be
If we assume that all bidders are risk-averse, then, a = r 1 h is CRRA parameter, r is the baseline risk-aversion that can take any value in the interval (0, 1), h = W * /w where w > W * and W * is the highest wealth she believes among other n − 1 bidders. To find W * for example, she can use the mean of nth order statistic of H of other n−1 bidders. In this case, she could have a uniform distribution U with support (0, 1) to know the risk-aversion of her rivals. On the other hand if w ≤ W * i.e. she believes that her wealth is less than or equal to at least one of the other n − 1 bidders, then her risk-aversion would be a = r. In this case, she believes that at least one of her rivals having more wealth could be more risk-averse than her. Now, if we assume that all bidders are risk-seeking then, a = r h where w > W * and r is the baseline risk-seeking parameter that can take any value in the interval (1, 2] . In this case, she could have a uniform distribution U with support (1, 2] to know the risk-seeking behaviour of her rivals. On the other hand if w ≤ W * i.e. she believes that her wealth is less than or equal to at least one of the other n − 1 bidders, then her risk-seeking parameter would be a = r. In this case, she believes that her rivals' risk-seeking parameter takes values in the interval (1, 2 h ] i.e. at least one of her rivals could be less risk-seeking than her.
If we assume that all bidders are risk-neutral then, a = r and their optimal bid would be independent of their wealth.
For all other n − 1 bidders with their own wealth w i and own true values v i , the expression (19) would hold. The equilibrium bid should be b(v i ) for the i th bidder. As this is an optimum of function (19) and b(·) is continuous,
for x in some ball around v. At that value of x, the derivative of the above expression must be zero.
Solving the above differential equation for any v in (γ, κ] with γ ≥ τ , we get
where a = r 1 h for risk-averse bidders and a = r h for risk-seeking bidders if w > W * otherwise a = r. In general, the integral in above expression needs numerical solution.
Example 2 Suppose that the value each bidder holds is an independent draw from the uniform distribution G(v) = v−γ κ−γ with support (γ, κ] and the auctioned item has reserve price τ such that γ ≥ τ . It is also assumed that each bidder draws other bidders' wealth from the distribution H(w) = w−α β−α with support [α, β] such that α ≥ γ. Assuming Brenda and all other bidders are risk-neutral i.e. a = 1, the closed form equilibrium bid function for Equation
Assuming v = $150, τ = γ = $30 and κ = $200, Figure 5 shows that Brenda's bid increases with an increase in the number of bidders n. Now, we assume that Brenda and all other bidders are risk-averse. We take two cases. In the first case, we assume that w > W * and in the second case, we assume that w ≤ W * .
1. Let Brenda have wealth w = $250 > W * and finds the highest wealth W * among other n − 1 bidders by placing a subjective distribution on their wealth as given by
where h(w) is the pdf of W . Let W (1) < W (2) < W (3) < · · · < W k be the order statistics of W where k is the highest order statistic among other n − 1 bidders. Let l(w k ) be the distribution of kth order statistic and could be found as l(w k ) = kh(w)H(w) k−1 .
Now, the mean of the kth order statistic is
Assuming β = 250, α = 50, k = n − 1 and substituting these values in the above Equation, we get E(W k ) = W * = (n − 1) × 250 + 50 n In this case, her risk-aversion would be a = r 1 h = r w W * and r is assumed to take any value in the interval (0, 1).
2. Let Brenda have wealth w = $150 ≤ W * . In this case, her risk-aversion would be a = r.
For both cases, the closed form equilibrium bid function for Equation (20) would be
(21) Figure 6 shows the plots of Brenda's bid function for different values of n where all bidders are risk-averse and her true value v = $150 and γ = $30. Upper graph represents how Brenda's bid function changes at different riskaversion levels for the first case i.e. w > W * while the lower graph represents how Brenda's bid function changes at different risk-aversion levels for the second case i.e. w ≤ W * . It shows that being wealthier than the other n − 1 bidders, she would bid more aggressively and could have a greater chance to win the auctioned item. It also shows that with increase in n, Brenda would expect an increase in W * and consequently her bid would increase. Now, we assume that Brenda and all other bidders are risk-seeking and again take those two cases. In the first case, we assume that w > W * and in the second case, we assume that w ≤ W * .
1. Let Brenda have wealth w = $250 > W * among other n−1 bidders. So, her risk-seeking parameter would be a = r h = r W * w and r is a baseline risk-seeking parameter that can take any value in the interval (1, 2].
2. Let Brenda have wealth w = $150 ≤ W * among other n − 1 bidders.
Thus, her risk-seeking parameter in this case would be a = r.
For these cases, we will have the same closed form solution as we find in (21) but with a = r h . Figure 7 shows the plots of Brenda's bid function for different values of n where all bidders are risk-seeking and her true value v = $150 and γ = $30.
Upper graph represents how Brenda's bid function changes at different riskseeking levels for the first case i.e. w > W * while the lower graph represents how Brenda's bid function changes at different risk-seeking levels for the second case i.e. w ≤ W * . It shows that being wealthier than the other n − 1 bidders, she could be less risk-seeking, could bid higher than the other bidders and could have greater chance to win the auctioned item. It also shows that with increase in n, Brenda would expect an increase in W * and consequently her bid would increase. 
Asymmetric Case
We consider there are two bidders, Brenda and Charles for this case. Bayesian game theoretic perspective for the asymmetric case assumes that both Brenda and Charles draw their valuations for the item not from the same but from different distributions which are commonly known to each bidder. ARA solves the problem from Brenda's perspective where she believes that Charles will randomly draw the value of the item for Brenda from a distribution which is different from his own distribution and it assumes that the distributions are not commonly known to both bidders. So, Brenda does not know about Charles true value v C for the auctioned item and his wealth w C and places distributions G BC on his true value and H BC on his wealth. Likewise, she believes that Charles also does not know about her true value v B for the auctioned item and her wealth w B and he places distributions G CB on her true value and H CB on her wealth.
Thus, Brenda would solve 
where R B is Charles's belief about Brenda's baseline risk behaviour parameter that she believes and h = w C /w B . Note that if w C > w B , then Brenda believes that Charles's risk behaviour would be A C as defined in Equation (12) and that of her risk behaviour would be A B = R B . However, if w B > w C , then Brenda believes that Charles's risk behaviour would be A C = R C and that of her risk behaviour would be A B as defined in Equation (23). Figure  8 is the MAID that represents the asymmetric case for two bidders. Taking the first derivative and then equating the system of simultaneous Equations (22) to zero, Brenda could find the system of differential equations given by
Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) stated that in general, no closed-form solution exists for the system of differential equations (24) when Brenda and Charles are assumed to be risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking bidders and numerical methods are required to find the solutions. However, Kaplan and Zamir (2012) found analytical solutions for some special cases where they draw bidders' valuations for the auctioned item from the uniform distributions assuming the bidders are risk-neutral. For example, assuming V B ∼ U(γ 1 , κ 1 ], V C ∼ U(γ 2 , κ 2 ], τ ≤ (γ 1 + γ 2 )/2 and γ 1 < γ 2 , they found the following inverse equilibrium bid functions for Brenda and Charles respectively
where
are the constants and the lower and upper support of the bid are
.
for Brenda and Charles respectively may be computed from Equation (25). Note that, in case of risk-neutral bidders, inverse bid functions (25) would be independent of bidders' wealth. Whereas, in case of risk-averse or risk-seeking behaviour of bidders, the inverse bid functions obtained from (24) would depend upon bidders' wealth because A C and A B we defined in (12) and (23) respectively are function of their wealths.
Example 3 Suppose that Brenda believes that Charles has a uniform distribution G CB (v B ) = v B −γ 1 κ 1 −γ 1 with support (γ 1 , κ 1 ] about her true value V B and she believes that Charles's valuation has the uniform distribution G BC (v C ) = v C −γ 2 κ 2 −γ 2 with support (γ 2 , κ 2 ] with γ 1 < γ 2 . The auctioned item has a reserve price τ which is known in advance to both bidders.
Lets assume that τ = $30, γ 1 = $40, γ 2 = $50, κ 1 = $150, κ 2 = $200 and Brenda and Charles are risk-neutral i.e. A B = A C = 1. Risk-neutrality implies that their bid functions would be independent of their wealths. Substituting these values in Equation (25), we would have the inverse bid functions v B (b) and v C (b) for Brenda and Charles respectively. Then, from these inverse bid functions, we can compute the bid functions b(v B ) and b(v C ) for Brenda and Charles respectively. The graphs of these bid functions are shown in Figure 9 . This shows that in equilibrium, Brenda having low valuation than Charles would bid more aggressively. 
Discussion
In this paper, we have focused on finding the optimal bid for FPSB auctions from one of the bidder's perspective using ARA while assuming the bidders are risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking and the auctioned item has a reserve price. We have developed a new utility function which is quite realistic. Moreover, based on the argument that bidders' willingness to pay for the normal item increases with their wealth, we have introduced a new CRRA parameter. For the non-strategic play and BNE solution concepts, we have taken into account the significance of wealth effect combined with the risk-aversion (risk-seeking) effect and showed that when the bidders are riskaverse (risk-seeking) and have different wealths, they bid more with their increase in wealth. Also, risk-averse (risk-seeking) bidders who are more wealthier, bid higher than the risk-averse (risk-seeking) ones who are less wealthier. However, wealth has no effect on bidders' bids if they are assumed to be risk-neutral.
However, Brenda could have concept uncertainty i.e. she could be uncertain about the solution concept that Charles will use to find his optimal bid. In this case, she can put her subjective probabilities ρ j to each solution concept J that Charles can use, with ρ j = 1. Then, she can take weighted average of her optimal bids obtained from each solution concept for which the weights could be her belief about the type of Charles's solution concept.
We have assumed that Brenda choose a value w C = $150 from the dis-tribution H BC for Charles's wealth. However, she can perform Monte Carlo simulations to determine a value of Charles's wealth.
As, a critical issue in the application of ARA is prior elicitation. The practical difficulty of elicitation raises the question of robustness i.e., we want our model to be robust to the elicited probabilities and utilities. This could be achieved by performing robust Bayesian analysis. Ríos Insua et al. (2016) have provided a framework of robust methods in ARA for sequential games and simultaneous games.
Furthermore, ARA framework could be applied to other solution concepts such as mirror equilibrium, minimax perspective or level-k thinking assuming two or more bidders who may assumed to be risk-averse or risk-seeking and have different wealth levels when the auctioned item has reserve price which is known to each bidder in advance. Moreover, ARA solutions have yet to be found for each of the solution concept assuming the bidders are heterogeneous in their risk behaviour i.e. one bidder may assumed to be a risk-neutral while the other bidder could be assumed a risk-averse or risk-seeking with their different wealth levels. Also, ARA solutions for each of the solution concept mentioned above could be found while assuming that the auctioned item has a reserve price which is unknown to all bidders. Further, it could be interesting to find ARA solutions for the utility function that incorporates bidders winning and losing regret such as used by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) .
